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Kant on the Acquisition of Geometrical Concepts 
 
1. Construction and Concept Acquisition 
 
Kant thought of concepts as falling into three broad classes. As well as empirical 
concepts, we are in possession of two types of a priori concepts.1 In the first case, there 
are ‘pure sensible’ concepts, i.e. mathematical concepts (e.g. see A140-1/B180); secondly, 
there are what I’ll refer to as categorial concepts (i.e. the Categories), concepts that are 
analogues of traditional metaphysical concepts such as <cause>, <substance>, etc.2 That a 
concept is a priori does not entail that it is non-acquired, however. Kant repeatedly states 
that all concepts, a priori concepts included, are acquired.3 For Kant, the acquisition 
procedure for empirical concepts is conceived along the lines of a Lockean abstraction 
procedure.4 Mathematical concepts, I will argue, are acquired through a special process of 
definition involving a procedure Kant calls ‘construction.’5 
 In this paper I present an account of Kant’s account of geometrical construction, 
understood as a concept acquisition procedure.6 Construction has not usually been 
considered as a concept acquisition procedure and one possible reason for this is that 
Kant’s well-known example of construction, the proof procedure of Euclid’s I.32 in the 
Discipline of Pure Reason, seems to begin from a scenario where two inquirers, a 
philosopher and a mathematician, are already in possession of a concept (in this case, the 
concept <triangle>). It therefore seems that Kant is indicating that the construction 
procedure is a process of validating the already acquired concept by way of Euclidean 
proof. As such, construction is it seems better characterized as a justification procedure 
KAGC - Callanan
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for an already-possessed concept rather than a concept acquisition procedure for that 
concept.  
 Another worry regarding treating construction as an acquisition procedure 
concerns Kant’s general Critical approach to epistemic justification. Part of Kant’s 
‘normative turn’, it is often supposed, is a general opposition to the justification of a 
concept’s conditions of use by providing a full account of that concept’s possession 
conditions. The quaestio juris with regard to a concept’s employment in judgment is 
supposed to have been seen by Kant as not sufficiently secured by the successful 
answering of a quaestio facti with regard to the conditions under which that concept has 
come to be acquired (A84-5/B116-7). If construction is indeed a process of concept 
acquisition then – since it seems that Kant certainly does regard construction as a 
justification procedure – it would entail that a sufficient account of the acquisition 
conditions for an a priori concept can indeed suffice to provide justification for that 
concept’s use. On such an interpretation Kant’s account of construction would offer a 
significant qualification, if not a reformulation, of his perceived normative ambitions in 
the first Critique.  
 Despite these concerns, I would claim that a case can be made for interpreting 
construction as a concept acquisition procedure. The account presupposes a broader 
methodological perspective on Kant’s epistemological project in the first Critique and in 
particular the nature of Kant’s ‘how possible?’ question. In asking how synthetic a priori 
propositions are possible, Kant is asking how it is that we have come to possess the 
knowledge that we in fact possess.7 This question should be explored as an expression of 
a more specific question, namely, how is it that we have come to possess the concepts 
that figure in those knowledge-generating and knowledge-preserving judgments? 
Pursuing Kant’s epistemological project along these lines can, I claim, provide a fruitful 
reading of his account of mathematical knowledge.8   
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This is the central feature of Kant’s famous discussion at A716-7/B744-5 of the 
geometer’s proof of proposition I.32 of Euclid’s Elements, that the internal angles of all 
triangles necessarily equal the sum of two right angles. Specifically, Kant is attempting to 
show that the full-blooded mathematical concept of triangularity could itself only have 
been acquired through a proof involving intuition. In this sense the diagrammatic proof 
procedure itself constitutes the acquisition conditions for that concept. Only through 
such reasoning, Kant claims, could the epistemic access to necessarily true propositions 
be secured. Combining the two claims, I argue that Kant reverses the explanatory order 
of the Leibnizian account of the relation between concept possession and knowledge. 
We do not satisfy the possession conditions for a geometrical concept and then use that 
possessed concept to secure a priori knowledge, but rather we meet the possession 
conditions for that concept by way of securing a priori knowledge about that concept’s 
extension.  
The standard reading of this example is that it is directed to showing the 
necessity of intuitions for the acquisition of synthetic a priori knowledge. In this case the 
requirement is that of the performance of a proof procedure upon a spatial particular in 
the form of a geometrical diagram. Kitcher’s comment captures what can appear to be 
Kant’s methodology here: 
 
We are supposed to gain a priori knowledge of the elementary properties of triangles 
by using our grasp on the concept of triangle to construct a mental picture of a 
triangle and by inspecting this picture with the mind’s eye. (1980, 8) 
 
I claim that this reading gets Kant’s intentions the wrong way around. The example of 
I.32 is in fact supposed to show that we must represent an empirical or mental image of a 
triangle in order to acquire the concept of a triangle. The example is primarily directed 
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towards showing how the geometer acquires the full, developed mathematical concept 
<triangle>. Central to the account presented here is that it is only through the deployment 
of concrete representations of particular triangles that the appropriate modal 
phenomenology involved in proof procedures can be generated. Furthermore, it is only 
via a procedure that generates the appropriate modal phenomenology that, Kant thinks, 
the a priori content of such concepts and the necessarily true judgments formed with 
them can be explained. 
The aims and context of Kant’s discussion of geometrical concept acquisition 
can only be appreciated against the Pre-Critical development of his views. The questions 
pursued in the Critique concern Kant’s submission to the Berlin Academy’s Prize Essay 
competition, the Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and 
Morality,9 published in 1764 as the runner-up submission. The question set for the 
competition was whether metaphysical propositions could be proven and known with a 
certainty comparable to that of the propositions of geometry. The Inquiry expressed 
Kant’s growing disillusion at the time for the prospects for metaphysics, though many of 
the claims from the Inquiry survived directly into the ‘dogmatic use’ section in the Critique 
nearly two decades later, when Kant had regained his optimism. I’ll first outline the 
claims in the Inquiry that found their way into the Critical system. Secondly, I will outline 
the new model of mathematical cognition presented in the ‘dogmatic use’ section in the 
Critique. Thirdly, I will present the alternative reading of the example of the Euclidean 
proof of proposition I.32. Finally, I will consider some of the implications of the reading 
suggested here.  
 
 
2. Geometrical Concept Acquisition in the Inquiry 
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 By 1763, when Kant was composing the Inquiry, he had already come to hold that 
all previous metaphysicians had laboured under a misapprehension, namely that they 
could imitate the methodology of mathematics. That this was in fact impossible would 
have been clear to them had they paid sufficient attention to how mathematics is actually 
practiced, and specifically to the crucial issue of the conditions under which we come to 
possess mathematical concepts.10 In mathematics we acquire the relevant concepts 
through a self-conscious, voluntary and creative act of defining them, by bringing together 
already possessed sub-concepts into a synthetic whole: 
 
There are two ways in which one can arrive at a general concept: either by the 
arbitrary combination of concepts, or by separating out that cognition which has 
been rendered distinct by means of analysis. Mathematics only ever draws up its 
definitions in the first way. For example, think arbitrarily of four straight lines 
bounding a plane surface so that the opposite sides are not parallel to each other. 
Let this figure be called a trapezium. The concept which I am defining is not given 
prior to the definition itself; on the contrary, it only comes into existence as a result 
of that definition. Whatever the concept of a cone may ordinarily signify, in 
mathematics the concept is the product of the arbitrary representation of a right-
angled triangle which is rotated on one of its sides. In this and in all other cases the 
definition obviously comes into being as a result of synthesis. (Inquiry, 2:276)11 
 
Kant’s account depends on a distinction between concepts that are created and those 
that are ‘given.’12 That a concept is given for Kant does not entail that it is non-acquired, 
but rather that it has been acquired on some non-arbitrary grounds. One possibility is 
that the non-arbitrary grounds are that certain concepts have a pragmatic indispensability 
to the course of ordinary experience.13 Thus there are some concepts that, whatever the 
particular manner of their acquisition, are routinely acquired for the purposes of the 
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minimal representation of the world by ordinary agents. This is suggested by Kant’s use 
of <time> as an example of a given concept – citing Augustine, Kant characterizes it as a 
concept that we all take ourselves to possess though one of which we also all lack a clear 
understanding (Inquiry, 2: 283-4). The concept is presumably pragmatically indispensable: 
it and its cognates are required for an enormous range of simple communicative acts, for 
example; yet this indispensability does not entail that we have a sound understanding of 
just what time is. It is this circumstance in which we find ourselves – possessing concepts 
of which we all claim some minimal mastery but of which we lack a full understanding – 
that prompts inquiry itself. Since metaphysical concepts are given, a definition represents 
not so much the starting point but rather the end point for inquiry.14  
By contrast, a voluntarily created concept is marked out by the ‘arbitrariness’ of 
this act of creation. An arbitrary combination should not be taken to entail that the 
content of the concept formed is in any way contingent – it merely marks the fact that 
the concept’s possession is contingent, since it has taken place through a self-conscious 
decision to form that concept, presumably without being prompted by the pragmatic 
needs that stimulate the acquisition of given concepts. In metaphysics we proceed 
towards a definition through decomposition of a concept into its fundamental sub-
concepts, and this presents the most important point of contrast with the method of 
geometry – ‘geometers acquire their concepts by means of synthesis, whereas philosophers 
can only acquire their concepts by means of analysis – and that completely changes the 
method of thought.’ (Inquiry, 2: 289)15   
Although it can occasionally appear that the mathematician is putting forward 
analytic definitions, mathematics always functions in the synthetic definitional manner – 
to think otherwise ‘is always a mistake’ (Inquiry, 2: 277). If it appears that one is making 
inferences that follow directly from the meaning of a given concept, it will always turn 
out that ‘in the end nothing is actually inferred from such definitions, or, at any rate, the 
 7 
immediate inferences which he draws ultimately constitute the mathematical definition 
itself’ (Inquiry, 2: 277). Thus in the Inquiry Kant holds that not only are the possession 
conditions for mathematical concepts the results of an activity of synthesis, but also that 
those possession conditions can in fact be constituted by the inferences that the 
mathematician performs. If it appears that a mathematician is making an analytic 
definition by decomposing concepts, it can turn out that this mistaken impression is 
caused by the fact that just what it is to grasp a concept’s content is just to be able to 
make certain rational rule-governed procedures over particular figures. Kant’s own 
example is instructive here: what it is to grasp the concept <cone> is constituted by the 
subject’s grasp of an operation upon a geometrical figure, that of rotating the figure of a 
triangle along one of its sides. Moreover, there is a kind of reciprocal relation here 
between two capacities – the capacity to grasp a concept’s content on the one hand and 
the capacity to represent a token of the type expressed by that concept on the other. 
What is required for a subject to represent a token cone is just that the subject can 
understand an operational rule regarding the rotation a triangle, the latter which just 
constitutes the content of the concept <cone>. Conversely, what is required for a subject 
to grasp the concept <cone> is just that the subject can perform the operation required 
for representing a token of that type. 
Kant’s account of geometrical knowledge hinges upon the epistemic role of 
‘individual signs’ (Inquiry, 2: 279). Individual signs are representations whose explicit 
intentional content is the presentation of a particular (they present the universal ‘in 
concreto’, as Kant puts it). This is in contrast to natural language, which ‘represent[s] the 
universal in abstracto’ (Inquiry, 2: 279), i.e. words are representational vehicles that can 
purport to capture the generality of their content, e.g. as with ‘triangularity.’16 The signs 
deployed in metaphysics are invariably signs in abstracto in the form of natural language. 
Ironically though, the fact that natural language consists of such signs actually constitutes 
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an impediment for its task of expressing universal claims. In Kant’s view, signs in abstracto 
are clearly inferior to signs in concreto with regard to their power to express the universals 
with which they are concerned. For example, a sign in concreto in geometry might be a 
drawing of a triangle, which provides a concrete instantiation of the universal of 
triangularity. In the Inquiry Kant seems to be as of yet unperturbed by the generality 
problem in geometry, i.e. concerning just how the use of a particular example might 
suffice as an exemplar on the basis of which general claims might be made.17 Rather, at 
this point he seems to take it for granted as a remarkable fact that mathematics, unlike 
metaphysics, just is a practice whereby ‘to discover the properties of all circles, one circle 
is drawn’ (Inquiry, 2:278). There is therefore a link made in the pre-Critical period 
between the possible representation of tokens of a particular type and the possibility of 
grasping necessary truths about the relevant type.  
For this reason, Kant thinks, ‘nothing has been more damaging to philosophy 
than mathematics, and in particular the imitation of its method in contexts where it cannot 
possibly be employed.’ (Inquiry, 2: 283) Yet this conclusion obscures the crucial insight 
that Kant brings from the Inquiry to the Critique of Pure Reason. In the Pre-Critical period, 
Kant had already held that individual signs are the indispensable means for grasping 
necessary truths about mathematical universals; according to the Critical model of 
cognition, all grasping of synthetic necessary truth must occur via the presentation of 
particulars through intuition. The Inquiry marks a crucial step in Kant’s rejection of the 
rationalist model of discursive cognition, considered as knowledge gained through 
discursive representation alone through analysis. It is in the Inquiry that he first 
recognizes the importance of resisting the thought that the appropriate manner of 
expressing the generality of necessary truths through the exclusive use of signs in 
abstracto, such as the expression of concepts in natural language.18  
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To summarize, Kant was by 1763 already committed to some particular claims 
regarding the status of geometrical concepts. Firstly, he maintained that the security of 
propositions in geometry was grounded upon the security of geometrical concepts. 
Secondly, he maintained that the security of geometrical concepts was grounded by their 
having a valid origin, in the literal sense of having secure acquisition conditions.  Thirdly, 
he maintained that the security of those acquisition conditions was achieved by virtue of 
the acquisition conditions for the specific intensional content essentially involving 
epistemic acquaintance with token representatives of the relevant extension of the 
concept acquired. Fourthly, he maintained that in some cases the intension of the 
relevant concept could itself be constituted by non-syllogistic inferences. This is to say 
that there are some rational rule-governed representational operations – such as rules for 
possible triangle-rotation – performed just for the purposes of representing tokens of the 
relevant type. This already presents a radical difference from the nature of empirical 
concept acquisition, whereby the achievement of representing tokens of a type is 
explanatorily prior to the achievement of acquiring the concept that is abstracted from 
those representations.  On Kant’s account of geometrical concept acquisition, there can 
be no explanatory priority between the representation of a token of a type and the 
acquisition of the concept that expresses that type. 
 
 
3. Intuition and Construction 
 
By the time Kant presented his account of mathematical cognition in the first 
Critique, nearly two decades later, his view of knowledge had changed radically. The 
change could be expressed by contrasting it with the rejected rationalist model of 
knowledge. The achievement of veridical representation for the rationalist is secured 
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through discursive representation alone, through pure acts of thinking. The transition 
from the state of lacking knowledge to the state of possessing it is to be understood as 
the transition from a state of indistinct and obscure thought to clear and distinct thought. 
The confusion of obscure thought is due to the impurities of sensory representations 
infecting the capacity of thought itself. Thus the achievement of knowledge is one that 
would present no challenge if our discursive capacity were allowed to perform its task 
unimpeded, since the outputs of the human discursive capacity are both necessary and 
sufficient for knowledge acquisition.  
Kant’s picture of the mind is, as with most early modern philosophers, 
considered in terms of certain representational capacities. As well as our discursive 
capacities, such as the understanding and reason, Kant claims we also possess a range of 
non-discursive representational capacities. Amongst those non-discursive 
representational capacities are the familiar ones of the sensory modalities, memory and 
imagination. The Critique though marks the recognition of the requirement of further, 
distinct type of non-discursive representational capacity, that of intuition.19 In a broader 
sense Kant’s project is motivated by the denial of the rationalist picture and by the 
thought that the necessary co-deployment of both discursive and non-discursive 
capacities can – on occasion – be the jointly sufficient conditions for knowledge 
acquisition.  
Although our intuitional capacity makes possible the receipt of sensory 
representational content, intuition also contributes its own representational content.20 
For any given perceptual experience, that experience will contain representational 
content that is provided solely by the sensory modalities, but it will also contain content 
that, though capable of being expressed through several sensory modalities,21 is not itself 
generated by the senses (either individually or in complex combination). Kant claims that 
for any given perception of an object, the spatiotemporal content of that representation 
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does not come within the sensory content that constitutes the ‘matter’ of perceptual 
experience (A20/B34). Yet given that we do in fact represent spatiotemporal features of 
objects, and assuming that the products of senses exhaust the non-contributed portion 
of human beings’ representational content, it must be the case that the spatiotemporal 
content within our perceptual representations is contributed content (B1-2). For Kant our 
intuitional capacity can also be activated either with regard to particular sensory 
experiences or in the imagination (A713/B741). When this activity of the interaction of 
our imaginational and intuitional capacities occurs, the representations produced in 
imaginational space are ‘pure’ (B3).22  
In the ‘dogmatic use’ section of the Critique Kant retains many of the previously 
expressed commitments, most notably his claim that there is an essential difference 
between the methods of metaphysics and mathematics. By the time of the Critical 
system, Kant was still of the opinion that the superiority of mathematics was related to 
its ability to  ‘go back to the sources of its concepts’. This difference is now expressed in 
terms of a special procedure that is particular to mathematics, that of construction. In 
explaining why definitions can only be provided in mathematics, he expresses many of 
the previous claims from the Inquiry: 
 
Thus there remain no other concepts that are fit for being defined than those 
containing an arbitrary synthesis which can be constructed a priori; and thus only 
mathematics has definitions. For the object that it thinks it also exhibits a priori in 
intuition, and this can surely contain neither more nor less than the concept, since 
through the explanation of the concept the object is originally given, i.e., without the 
explanation being derived from anywhere else. (A729-30/B757-8) 
 
Kant’s account of construction, I will argue, involves the amalgamation of several of the 
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key claims seen before: construction itself is nothing but the acquisition of concepts 
through acts of definition, where the latter is understood as manifested by inferential 
procedures performed upon concrete representations of particulars. Only through this 
procedure can certain objects even be thought, since those concrete representations are 
constitutive of the proof-procedures that must be performed even to acquire the 
developed concepts of mathematics. Whereas before the deployment of individual signs 
was a mere ‘aid to thought’, Kant now views the deployment of representations of 
particulars, in the form of intuitions, as necessary for the acquisition of the relevant 
conceptual content and the very capacity to think of the essential properties of the objects 
that fall under such concepts.  
It is worth noting that the first Critique abounds with unambiguous statements to 
the effect that mathematical concepts are those that we create.23 Kant couldn’t be more 
explicit as to the nature of mathematical definition – it is a concept-creation procedure: 
 
[P]hilosophical definitions come about only as expositions of given concepts, but 
mathematical ones as constructions of concepts that are originally made, thus the 
former come about only analytically through analysis (the completeness of which is 
never apodictically certain) while the latter come about synthetically, and therefore 
make the concept itself, while the former only explain it. (A730/B758) 
 
Furthermore, Kant is clear that the task of creating a mathematical concept can 
be identical to and coterminous with the task of representing a member of that concept’s 
extension. In the conclusion to the section on the Postulates of Empirical Thinking in 
General, Kant describes a mathematical postulate as follows: 
 
Now a postulate in mathematics is the practical proposition that contains nothing 
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but the synthesis by which we first give to ourselves an object and generate its 
concept—e.g., to describe a circle with a given line from a given point on a plane – 
and such a proposition cannot be proved, because the procedure it requires is 
precisely that by which we generate the concept of such a figure. (A234/B287)  
 
Similarly, Kant’s well-known claim regarding synthesis in §24 of the B-Deduction seems 
to put a close connection between the very ability to think of something, which requires 
possession of the concept of that thing, with producing a representation of a token 
example of the thing in general, if only in the visual imagination. Kant claims both that  
 
We cannot think of a line without drawing it in thought, we cannot think of a 
circle without describing it, we cannot represent the three dimensions of space at 
all without placing three lines perpendicular to each other at the same point... 
(B154) 
 
The three examples used here are the concepts <line>, <circle> and <three-dimensional 
space>. In each case Kant claims that our capacity to possess this concept is dependent 
on our capacity to represent a referent of the concept. The capacity to think of a line is 
dependent on the capacity to draw a token line, the capacity to wield the concept <circle> 
is dependent on our capacity to present a circular object to consciousness. The third 
example, that of the capacity to grasp <three-dimensional space>, is made possible in a 
slightly different way. While our grasp of <line>, and <circle> is secured by the capacity 
to represent particular lines and circles, our ability to grasp <three-dimensional space> is 
secured by our ability to perform a certain geometrical operation upon a spatial manifold. 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt about the intended order of explanation here: it is not 
the case that we can put three lines perpendicular to each other at the same point because 
we have an antecedent conceptual grasp that space is three-dimensional; on the contrary, 
 14 
it is because we can put three particular lines in that particular relation to each other that 
we are able to secure a conceptual grasp of the propositional content that space is three-
dimensional. In all these cases, the initial grasp of these conceptual contents is directly 
tied to specific non-conceptual representational capacities to represent and manipulate 
spatial particulars in different ways. 
 In the Prolegomena, the distinction between a priori and a posteriori synthetic 
judgments is not drawn in terms of what allows for and what does not allow for 
successful concept-formation, but rather in terms of the status of the judgments that 
issue from the concept that is formed in each case: 
 
 …[J]ust as empirical intuition makes it possible for us, without difficulty, to 
amplify (synthetically in experience) the concept we form of an object of intuition 
through new predicates that are presented by intuition itself, so too will pure 
intuition do the same only with this difference: that in the latter case the synthetic 
judgment will be a priori certain and apodictic, but in the former only a posteriori  
and empirically certain, because the former contains only what is met with in 
contingent empirical intuition, while the latter contains what necessarily must be 
met with in pure intuition, since it is, as intuition a priori, inseparably bound with 
the concept before all experience  or individual perception. (Prolegomena, 4: 281) 
 
Here, Kant says that while empirical intuition allows for concept formation from which 
judgments regarding contingent truths can be made, pure intuition allows for the making 
of necessarily true judgments. Concepts formed from a posteriori individual perceptions 
afford judgments with a posteriori warrant; concepts formed from pure a priori intuition 
afford judgments with a priori warrant. The crucial innovation of the Critical model of 
cognition is to explain how we can access the necessity found in the judgments that can be 
formed by our use of such concepts. 
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This account of the a priori warrant for judgment relates to the account of 
geometrical construction presented in the Discipline. Here Kant claims that while neither 
empirical nor categorial concepts can be defined, mathematical concepts can be defined 
and this is just because mathematical concepts are created in voluntary acts of the 
understanding: 
 
Since therefore neither empirical concepts nor concepts given a priori can be 
defined, there remain none but arbitrarily thought ones for which one can attempt 
this trick. In such a case I can always define my concept: for I must know what I 
wanted to think, since I deliberately made it up…(A729/B758).  
 
Kant thus maintains the same position outlined in the Inquiry, namely that the possibility 
of definition is restricted to elective concepts, ones that have been ‘arbitrarily’ made up 
by the subject herself. It is also clear that Kant continues to maintain that the 
mathematician for just those same reasons secures epistemic certainty without difficulty. 
However, Kant identifies in the Critique a challenge that he did not raise for himself in 
the Inquiry. The challenge is how these two elements, the elective formation conditions of 
mathematical concepts, and the certainty of mathematical judgment, can be compatible. 
If, as he maintains, mathematical concepts are simply ‘arbitrarily’ created concepts, then 
how can mathematical knowledge be secured at all? Kant is well aware that a perennial 
source of error in the history of philosophy has been its practitioners’ disposition to 
indulge in the promiscuous formation of concepts without adequate warrant. Such 
‘invented concepts’ can systematically generate false judgments, just because they have 
been formed arbitrarily and without concern to the very possibility of objects falling 
under them.24 One might respond with the claim that elective concepts can have a 
positive truth-value, but that they are true only relative to an arbitrarily summoned-up 
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representation that is the ultimate referent of that concept. This though is to effectively 
characterize the concept as having a fictional status, since the objects that determine the 
concept’s truth conditions are themselves arbitrarily created referents. 
The challenge then is to show how mathematical concepts, as given by elective 
definitions, are not mere fictions as most voluntarily-formed concepts are. Kant’s 
strategy for denying that elective definitions are error-theoretic is initially to concede that 
such acts of definitions are not sufficient for definition of ‘a true object.’ He contrasts 
the case of mathematical concept-formation with that of empirical concept-formation, 
using the example of <chronometer> for the latter, and claiming that  
 
the object and its possibility are not given through this arbitrary concept; from the 
concept I do not even know whether it has an object, and my explanation could be 
better called a declaration (of my project) than a definition of an object. 
(A729/B757) 
 
With this empirical concept (one that combines the ideas of time-measurement and of a 
mechanical apparatus, say) I can grasp the content of the combined concept without 
having ever represented its referent. More pressingly, I can grasp the created content 
without knowing that it does have an actual or even possible object. For an arbitrarily 
created empirical concept, the conditions for grasping the intensional content and the 
conditions for representing its extension are distinct. As Kant concludes, the intensional 
content that is grasped is better thought of as a minimal set of directions for the 
pragmatic project of discovering the existence of the extension and its properties. 
 This feature of invented empirical concepts provides the contrast required for 
Kant’s articulation of how an arbitrarily created concept can nevertheless be one whose 
possession conditions ensures epistemic certainty in its use. An arbitrarily created 
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concept can guarantee reference if production of an example of the extension is a 
necessary condition of the formation of the concept itself. This can occur if and only if 
the concept’s intension itself is understood as a rule for the production of its referents. If 
a concept is one which can represent its extension in the same task of grasping its 
intension, then it is a concept that can be defined. This is what Kant claims does in fact 
occur on occasions of mathematical concept definition. In the passage previously quoted 
Kant claims that the only concepts ‘that are fit for being defined are those containing an 
arbitrary synthesis which can be constructed a priori, and thus only mathematics has 
definitions.’ (A729/B757) Kant is explicit here in linking the notions of definition, 
synthesis and construction. He says that a defined concept is one that ‘contains’ a rule for 
synthesis that itself makes possible the construction procedure. Kant’s avoidance of the 
problem of invented concepts requires taking him as holding that the conditions under 
which the concept is formed are the very conditions under which a possible member of 
its extension is represented, and that these conditions are the conditions of construction. 
 
 
 
4. Concept Acquisition and Content 
 
Kant uses a different geometrical proof to express his point, and the example 
employed is proposition I.32 of Euclid’s Elements. Before proceeding to the passage, it’s 
worth first noting that between the composition of the Inquiry and the first Critique, 
Leibniz’s Nouveaux Essais had appeared in print.25 There he would have seen the 
definition of ‘intuitive knowledge’ as knowledge of necessary truths which arises  
 
 18 
when the mind perceived the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by 
themselves, without the intervention of any other…In this, the mind is at no pains of 
proving or examining…the truth [As the eye sees light, so] the mind perceives, that 
white is not black, that a circle is not a triangle, that three [is] one and two. [This] 
knowledge is the clearest and most certain, that human frailty is capable of. (New 
Essays, Book IV, Ch. ii, §1: 361) 
 
When Leibniz comes to the issue of the nature of intuitive and demonstrative 
knowledge, one of the examples used is proposition I.32: 
 
Phil….Now, demonstrative knowledge is just a chain of items of intuitive knowledge 
bearing on ‘all the connections of intermediate ideas’. §2 For frequently the mind 
cannot join, compare or apply its ideas one to another, and it has to avail itself of one 
or more intermediate ideas to discover the agreement or disagreement which is 
sought; and this is what we call reasoning. For instance, in demonstrating that the three 
angles of a triangle are equal to the two right angles, one finds other angles which can 
be seen to be equal both to the three angles of the triangle and to two right angles. 
(New Essays, Book IV, Ch. ii, §2: 367)26 
 
Demonstrations lack the infallibility of items of intuitive knowledge just because they 
consist in chains and not in single units of grasping some certain truth (New Essays, Book 
IV, Ch. ii, §7: 368). The example of the New Essays suggests one possible origin of Kant’s 
connection between spatial representation and ‘intuitive’ inference. For Kant, the 
deployment of diagrammatic representations is not only a required enabling condition 
for knowledge of necessary truths but the deployment of those representations is also the 
explanatory basis of the immediate and certain grasp of that knowledge.27  
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Kant’s approach here is similar to the one adopted in the Inquiry. He contrasts 
what a ‘philosopher’ does, i.e. conceptual analysis, with the practice of the 
mathematician. The claim is that individual signs are in this case crucial to expressing the 
relevant necessary truth about triangles:  
 
Give a philosopher the concept of a triangle, and let him try to find out in his way 
how the sum of its angles must be related to a right angle. He has nothing but the 
concept of a figure enclosed by three straight lines, and in it the concept of equally 
many angles. Now he may reflect on this concept as long as he wants, yet he will 
never produce anything new. He can analyse and make distinct the concept of a 
straight line, or of an angle, or of the number three, but he will not come upon any 
other properties that do not already lie in these concepts. But not let the geometer 
take up this question. He begins at once to construct a triangle. Since he knows that 
two right angles together are exactly equal to all the adjacent angles that can be 
drawn at one point on a straight line, he extend one side of his triangle, and obtains 
two adjacent angles that together are equal to two right ones. Now he divides the 
external one of these angles by drawing a line parallel to the opposite side of the 
triangle, and sees that here there arises an external adjacent angle which is equal to 
an internal one, etc. In such a way, through a chain of inferences that is always 
guided by intuition, he arrives at a fully illuminating and at the same time general 
solution of the question. (A716-7/B745).28 
 
This passage is frequently taken by commentators as primarily directed towards 
showing that the proof-procedure for establishing the truth of proposition I.32 is not 
performed through conceptual analysis alone.29 In order to perform the task of proving 
I.32, we must perform the proof outlined in the Elements: 
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Briefly, the proof proceeds as follows: we construct a triangle ABC, then extend 
BC to point D, and draw a line CE that is parallel to BA. We see that the angle ⦣ abc is 
identical to that at ⦣ecd. Since AC is a transversal of two parallel lines, the opposing 
angles at ⦣bac and ⦣ace are equal. We see then that the internal angles of ABC are equal 
to the sum of the three angles ⦣ecd, ⦣ace and ⦣ acb (the latter which is held in 
common). Similarly, we see that those angles are together equal to the sum of two right 
angles, since we see that those angles together rest upon the straight line BD. Thus the 
internal angles of ABC must be equal to the sum of two right angles.  
 The example is not just directed at demonstrating the limitations inherent in any 
attempt to prove propositions from the mere analysis of the concept <triangle> alone. 
The example is also directed towards showing the impossibility of acquiring the full real 
concept <triangle> that we in fact possess through mere analysis of an initial nominal 
concept. The claim, I’d suggest, is that while <sum of interior angles necessarily equal to the sum 
of two right angles> is an essential part of the content of the concept <triangle>, accessing 
this content could have only come about through a proof procedure detailed. This 
alternative reading suggests that Kant’s claim is that this content cannot be acquired 
through mere analysis of the bare nominal concept of a triangle alone. Support for this 
E A 
 
    B     C 
D 
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reading can be found from Kant’s metaphysics lectures. There Kant discusses the same 
example, and characterizes it as one in which we are to think of both the philosopher 
and geometer beginning with a thin understanding of <triangle> and attempting to form a 
fuller version of that concept: 
 
Although synthetic judgments can be a posteriori judgments, they can also be 
judgments cognized a priori. But even a priori reason must add something that did not 
lie in the concept.….  
…in general synthetic judgments are possible only by means of the 
corresponding intuition and the concept formed and added to this, and that this 
intuition must happen a priori if the judgment is to be posited a priori. 
 E.g., the three angles of the triangle are equal to two right angles of 180°, is 
a synthetic judgment: for this proposition cannot be brought out of the analysis of a 
figure enclosed by three lines, rather it must be made at least in thought experiments 
for finding it and through that the proof is thought. (Metaphysik Vigilantius (K3), 
29:968-9)  
 
Kant evidently takes the metaphysician and geometer to be operating with no more 
than the nominal concept <triangle>, captured just as <figure enclosed by three straight lines>, 
i.e. the initial understanding of the concept that Euclid afforded himself in order to begin 
his proof procedure. Part of what we are supposed to grasp from the discussion of the 
I.32 example is that there is no available inferential transition from the concept <figure 
enclosed by three straight lines> to <internal angles necessarily equal to the sum of two right angles> 
just through a piece of analysis of the former concept. The latter propositional content 
cannot be justified just because the latter propositional content cannot be ‘brought out 
of’ the former content. Why this is so is because there are steps in the diagrammatic 
proof that, although properly characterised as achievements of understanding, are not 
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properly characterized as inferences in the common Early Modern sense at all, i.e. as steps 
that might be reconstructed in a piece of syllogistic reasoning with an intermediate 
middle term.  At vital points in the proof of I.32, the steps are not inferred in syllogistic 
reasoning but are just represented diagrammatically.  
The counterfactual claim employed in the thought experiment is one whereby we 
are to see that, were we (say) the kind of agents Hume characterizes us as being, we 
would in that case never have acquired the mathematical version of the concept 
<triangle> that we in fact possess. The conceptual content whose origin Kant is seeking 
to explain is that of <necessity>, but the only way we could have acquired that conceptual 
content is if somehow necessity was manifested within the phenomenology of our 
perceptual or imaginational experience. Just as a matter of fact, both Hume and Kant 
agree, sensory content doesn’t carry this modal inflection within it. But although we can’t 
sense that something must be the case, we do in fact perceive that something must be the 
case, as when performing Euclidean proofs. This achievement only occurs, Kant thinks, 
through the use of individual signs in the performance of inferences that themselves 
provide the possession condition of concepts.  
This allows for an understanding of the original import of Kant’s use of the 
example of the ‘first geometer’ in the B-preface to the Critique (Bxi-xii) There Kant 
lauded the first geometer for recognizing that the nature of the task at hand involved 
neither ‘reading off’ properties from a drawn figure, nor reading off from a concept, but 
instead drawing out from the proof procedure what the geometer had himself put in. 
The procedure Kant outlines here with regard to proposition I.32 is not that of just 
reading off properties from pictured instances of the initial concept <triangle> – all that 
would do would be to present a series of images of three straight lines laid end-to-end. 
What Kant is envisaging here is the concept <triangle> obtained via a caricatured 
empiricist concept acquisition process. Were we agents that acquired our mathematical 
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concepts by way of an empiricist model, through a Humean copying or Lockean 
abstracting from instances of presented sensory particulars, the concepts formed would 
only contain the content that reflects what we had read off from those presented 
particulars. But in that case the concept acquired would not include the content 
<necessity> at all, since the contents acquired would only have been perceptually 
presented as contingent (even if uniformly observed) properties of the representations of 
triangles (A718/B746). Yet, Kant claims we come to possess a concept that includes the 
content that the sum of the internal angles necessarily equals 180° degrees as part of the 
essential intensional content of that concept.  
For Kant, the task is to explain the modal phenomenology of geometrical 
judgment, i.e. how it is that we could have come to make judgments that are ‘combined 
with consciousness of their necessity’ (B41). I could of course gain some epistemic 
confidence that all triangles’ internal angles equal 180° inductively, but the judgment that 
they necessarily do so is a judgment with a distinct intension. Repeated perceptions that I 
have two hands might make it psychologically compelling for me to assent to that 
proposition, but no amount of such repetitions would engender in me the distinct 
judgment that it could not be otherwise. Yet, Kant holds, a single performance of the 
proof procedure for I.32 can make this distinct component of the judgment cognitively 
available to me, just because it is a procedure that allows me to perceive that it must be 
the case. Without such a procedure, we would not grasp the proposition’s truth in the 
way that we in fact grasp it.  
 The counterfactual reasoning is supposed to hold equally well against Leibnizian 
rationalism represented by Wolff and Mendelssohn.30 In his winning submission to the 
Prize Essay competition Mendelssohn maintains that we are able to untangle or unpack 
the concept <extension> into all the truths of geometry.31 Kant’s challenge is simply to 
untangle the conceptual content <sum of interior angles necessarily equal to the sum of two right 
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angles> from the initial concept <figure enclosed by three straight lines>. Decompose that 
initial concept all you like, Kant thinks, and the former constituent just won’t reveal 
itself. Analyzing  <figure enclosed by three straight lines> reveals nothing more than the 
original constituents: <figure>, <three>, <straight>, <line>, etc. The situation for the 
rationalist is the same it is for the empiricist – were our concept acquisition procedure 
the one envisaged, we would never have acquired the mathematical concept <triangle> 
that we in fact possess. Moreover, without those possessed concepts we would never be 
able to express the propositions that we can in fact express. Neither of these approaches 
can explain then how these synthetic a priori judgments are possible. 
 
 
5. Construction and Generality  
 
My claim is not that every occurrence of construction is always an action of 
concept acquisition, since surely Kant thinks that one may repeat the same proof without 
thereby acquiring the concept anew. Rather, my claim is that the conditions under which 
a geometrical concept is ‘originally given’ are just those construction procedures. In his 
reply to Kästner, Kant seems to acknowledge this point: 
 
However, that the possibility of a straight line and a circle can be proved, not 
mediately through proofs, but only immediately, through the construction of these 
concepts (which is not, to be sure, empirical), stems from the fact that among all 
constructions . . . some must be the first. 32 
 
My account might seem vulnerable to the objection that in Kant’s own presentation of 
an example of mathematical construction, that of the I.32 proof procedure, he clearly 
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sets up the case whereby each inquirer, the philosopher and the geometer are given the 
concept triangle before the construction procedure can take place. If this is correct, then 
of course the procedure itself cannot constitute the conditions for possession of the 
concept <triangle>. However, there are reasons already seen that lead one to think that 
this is not the case. Firstly, the passage quoted earlier from the Metaphysik Vigilantius 
shows Kant envisaging the case as one whereby the inquirer possesses the content <figure 
enclosed by three straight lines> but does not already possess the content <internal angles 
necessarily equal to the sum of two right angles> and where the goal is to form a new concept 
including this latter content. Secondly, it has also been already shown that in the case of 
empirical concepts, Kant allows that we can have some initial grasp of the content 
without our thereby possessing the definition of the concept. Kant makes reference to 
the notion of a ‘putative definition’ or ‘designation’ which he claims is only the 
elaboration of a minimal set of marks that allow one to identify a subject matter so that 
one can subsequently conduct experiments on that subject matter, thereby securing some 
knowledge of the essential marks of the kind under consideration (A728). There is no 
reason not to think that in the construction example, Kant is similarly imagining two 
inquirers with the nominal or putative definition of <triangle>, one which does not 
sufficiently count as the definition proper. Thirdly, Kant’s analysis of definition is 
premised on the idea that there is an ordinary or common signification attached to the 
natural language expression of a conceptual content that is prior to the proper definition. 
As was seen earlier, in the Inquiry Kant uses the distinction between the ‘ordinary 
signification’ and the mathematical definition of the concept <cone>: 
 
The concept which I am defining is not given prior to the definition itself, on the 
contrary, it only comes into existence as a result of that definition. Whatever the 
concept of a cone may ordinarily signify, in mathematics the concept is the product 
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of the arbitrary representation of a right-angled triangle which is rotated on one of 
its sides. (Inquiry, 2: 276). 
 
Here Kant gives an example of a concept of which we might have an ordinary grasp, 
perhaps based on a simple perceptual individuation capacity, and which gives us an initial 
intension. However, it does not constitute a grasp of the definition of that concept. The 
definition of <cone> is only grasped coterminously with the production of a cone 
through a representational operation upon an intuition of a triangle, since it is the case 
both that the definition provides the method for first representing a token of that type 
and that the representation of a token of that type is required to express the operational 
rule that forms the definition. Fourthly, the example at I.32 is understandable as based 
on a subject grasping a concept but without a clear grasp of the genuine intension that 
characterizes the essential marks of its extension. But this is not an unusual cognitive 
state within Kant’s theory of knowledge, since this is a cognitive state that familiarly 
occurs in any grasp of an analytic judgment. In making an analytic judgment, such as that 
‘all bodies are extended’, I am predicating of the subject concept a property that is in fact 
‘contained’ within that subject concept. For such judgments to be possible in a way that 
presents the illusion of being informative, Kant allows that we can think the predicate 
concept ‘confusedly’ in the subject concept  (A7/B11). Yet Kant would not deny that 
such a confused subject does not also have some minimal grasp of the intension of 
<body> in such a case. The notion between there being a graspable but only partially 
articulated conceptual content is implied by Kant’s very notion of analytic judgment. 
That same state is the one that is attributable to the mathematician prior to the 
performance of the I.32 proof.  
This leads to a second objection to this reading, namely that it threatens to render 
the relevant propositions analytic rather than synthetic a priori, since on my account the 
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propositions in question are capable of being cognised just off the basis of gaining a 
proper understanding of the relevant concept in the subject position of the judgment. 
However, it doesn’t follow that the judgement in such cases is analytic. Firstly, Kant 
frequently speaks of synthetic knowledge being in one sense knowledge that is made on 
the basis of some concept possession: 
 
If one is to judge synthetically about a concept, then one must go beyond this concept, 
and indeed go to the intuition in which it is given. For if one were to remain with that 
which is contained in the concept, then the judgment would be merely analytic, an 
explanation of what is actually contained in the thought. (A721/B749) 
 
Kant here characterizes judging synthetically as judging about a concept. He characterises 
synthetic a priori judgments as ones that identify features that ‘belong’ to the concept 
even though they do not ‘lie in it’ (A718/B746). In the Transcendental Analytic, Kant 
says that as soon as sensible conditions are involved, ‘synthetic judgments that flow a 
priori from pure concepts of the understanding’ can be determined (A136/B175). In the 
Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant similarly claims that there are synthetic a priori 
cognitions that ‘actually flow from the given concept’ of Space (B40). At A9/B13, Kant 
characterizes synthetic judgment in relation to causal judgment whereby ‘the 
understanding ‘seeks ‘to discover beyond the concept of A a predicate that is foreign to 
it and which it nevertheless believes to be connected with it’. If we take Kant at his word 
here then there is nothing contradictory in the claim that in making a synthetic judgment 
we are making claims that are in some sense true in virtue of the nature of the concept 
that features in the subject position of the judgment. The very distinction between 
analytic and synthetic judgment is not drawn in terms of whether a predicate is 
connected with a concept in the subject position or not; both types of judgment are 
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based on such a connection. The distinguishing factor is whether the relation of the 
connection between the concepts is based on containment or some other determining 
ground.  
It cannot be therefore that a judgment is analytic if and only if it is made on the 
basis of concept possession alone. It is rather that we are making an analytic judgment 
about that concept on the basis of our possession of that concept by appealing to the 
intensional features ‘contained’ in that concept, in Kant’s particular notion of 
containment.33 This is obscure in itself, and obviously more needs to be said here, not 
least with regard to the parameters determining Kantian analyticity. Why, for example, 
would an acquired mathematical concept of <triangle> not become the new initial version 
for our subsequent inquiries? Clearly it does not, since Kant held that what we can 
analytically infer from the concept <triangle> does not alter as a result of the construction 
procedure.  Yet the thought that it might do so only stems from the thought that 
somehow the parameters as to what contents are ‘contained’ in the concept <triangle> 
might alter as a result of the construction procedure, and there is no reason to think that 
he endorses this latter claim. 
Although the construction procedure would be a process enabling possession of 
a concept and the generation of knowledge in virtue of that possession, it does not 
follow that the knowledge generated is analytic. Rather construction is a concept-
acquisition procedure that involves the acquisition of essential marks of the concept that 
belong to it and yet are not contained in it. The procedure can reveal those non-contained 
essential intensional marks, but only by virtue of deploying some non-conceptual 
representational capacities and putting the relevant particular intuitions to use in 
inferential processes. The resulting judgments will be a priori just because the concept 
acquired expresses necessary truths about the extension and has occurred via the 
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provision of an a priori intuition; they will be synthetic because the concept acquired has 
been acquired through the mediating domain of sensible intuition.  
Kant expresses in the Critique the confidence he showed in the Inquiry that in 
mathematical cognition we can think ‘the universal in the particular.’ (A714/B742) Yet it 
is clear that by this time Kant was not insensitive to the generality problem. In the 
Schematism section, Kant in fact cites the construction procedure performed on 
intuitions as the grounds for resolving this problem. There he claims that there are 
schematic rules for the construction of triangles that allow us to avoid the dependence 
on particular ‘images’ of triangles: 
 
In fact it is not images of objects but schemata that ground our pure sensible 
concepts. No image of a triangle would ever be adequate to the concept of it. For 
it would not attain the generality of the concept, which makes this valid for all 
triangles, right or acute, etc., but would always be limited to one part of this 
sphere. The schema of the triangle can never exist anywhere except in thought, 
and signifies a rule of the synthesis of the imagination with regard to pure shapes 
in space. (A140-1/B180)34 
 
Whether we construct a triangle empirically on paper or imaginationally in our mind’s 
eye, there will always be some sensory image employed, either directly or indirectly within 
our visual imagination. It is the intuitional content imported into any sensory image 
deployed though that accounts for how the produced individual sign can express general 
truths about the extension of the concept. It is not the sensory imagistic content of the 
sign in concreto that is being attended to when we reason with triangle-images but rather 
the intuitional content contributed to and entangled within those representations.  
This content is only accessed through the construction procedure. One might ask 
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why this should resolve the generality problem though, rather than moving the 
problematic bump in the rug from the particularity of sensory content to the particularity 
of intuitional content. Why should the mere appeal to acts of construction grant us the 
security we need to infer general truths about the class? Kant’s answer to these questions 
must involve his commitment to the claim that ‘that which follows from the general 
conditions of the construction must also hold generally of the object of the constructed 
concept’ (A716/B744). This though just raises the same question anew, plus another. 
What determines that the conditions of construction are themselves general? 
Furthermore, on what grounds can one infer from the general nature of the concepts to 
the general nature of the objects that fall under them?  
Addressing these questions is beyond the scope of the present paper.35 This 
reading, if correct, does however suggests three points of general relevance to the 
understanding of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, points that I will merely raise here. The first 
is, as previously mentioned, that it is an oversimplification of Kant’s methodology if one 
attributes to him the view that the acquisition conditions of a concept are irrelevant to 
the correctness conditions for its use. At least with regard to the example of geometrical 
concepts, this is not the case. On the contrary, the correctness conditions for such 
concepts’ use are given by the construction conditions for those concepts: a concept 
applies to the extension that is exemplified on occasions of that concept’s construction. 
It is unclear how we are to understand Kant’s general normative turn in epistemology 
however if it does not imply a critique of the investigation into concept acquisition 
conditions as a general methodology.  
Secondly, there is the related point regarding Kant’s inquiry being one into the origin 
of the concept <necessity>. Kant’s claim is that this concept serves as a constituent 
content of both categorial and pure sensible concepts. Yet it is clear, I would claim, that 
his account of the justification of the use of this concept with regard to geometrical 
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concepts is just to show how the relevant concept is originally formed. This suggests that 
Kant’s general response to Hume should be understood not as limited to the justification 
of the concept <cause> but rather of the conceptual constituent conceptual content 
<necessity>. Furthermore, it suggests that his strategy for justifying that latter concept is 
identical to the task of explaining its valid acquisition. 
Finally, there is the issue with regard to the ‘sense and significance’ of a priori 
concepts. Kant appears on occasion to hold that categorial concepts might have an 
explanatorily prior and purely logical content that is capable of being first articulated in 
isolation from the conditions of sensibility, but that they subsequently receive further 
‘sense and significance’ with their application in the context of possible experience (e.g. 
A54/B78, A147/B188, A219/B266-7, A239/B298). However, Kant’s approach with 
regard to the a priori concepts of geometry involves an identification of the original 
conditions of their acquisition not with a prior abstract logical formulation of their 
content in purely discursive terms, but rather with their original generation as rules 
concretely manifested within spatiotemporal representation. The question raised 
concerns how we are to understand the explanatory priority relation between abstract 
and concrete expressions of discursive content for a priori concepts in general. My aim 
here has been to defend that thought that Kant does in fact think that uncovering the 
general conditions of the acquisition of geometrical concepts can suffice to legitimate 
those concepts in use. They do so by involving the representations of pure intuition as 
the fundamental referents of our geometrical knowledge claims. Ultimately then 
geometrical concepts are the literal products of our reflections upon the most general 
features of outer sense.36  
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1 E.g. A95, A129, B167, A310/B366, A 720/B748. Kant uses ‘a priori’ to modify a number of 
terms, such as ‘intuition’, ‘representation’, ‘principle’ ‘judgment’, ‘truth’, etc. I don’t explore the 
relationship between this and other uses of the modifier here. 
2 I use the angled brackets and italics to indicate mention of the concept. I don’t discuss here the 
concepts <Space> and <Time>, which also fall under the heading of pure sensible concepts, and 
which have their own acquisition procedure, as they relate to the pure intuitions of Space and 
Time.  
3 E.g., On a Discovery, 8:221. See also Inaugural Dissertation, §8, 2:395, §15, 2:406; Metaphysik 
Mrongovious, 29: 760-3. 
4 E.g., see the Blomberg Logic, §254; Jäsche Logic, §3. 
5 At A729/B757, having claimed that mathematics proceeds through the particular process of 
construction, Kant states that only mathematical concepts are apt for this process. As shall be 
discussed, only mathematics contains definitions, Kant thinks, because only mathematical concepts 
can be acquired through being defined in a construction procedure. Kant does speak of the 
acquisition procedure for categorial concepts as being of a specific kind, and he refers to this 
procedure as ‘original acquisition’ (On a discovery, 8:221). That a priori concepts are acquired at all 
might seem surprising, since whatever else it connotes, ‘a priori’ surely connotes some sort of 
‘independence from experience’. One can point out first of all that for Kant, a concept is a priori 
if and only if it issues in an a priori judgment when deployed, where the latter is understood as one 
whose truth conditions are not provided by sensory experience (even if sensory experience 
nevertheless serves as a necessary enabling condition for the possibility of such judgments – B1-
2). This condition does not by itself place any putative restrictions on a priori concepts’ 
possession conditions. Nevertheless, the very idea of categorial concepts as acquired might seem 
to be precluded by the fact that those concepts are for Kant necessary conditions of the 
possibility of experience – for discussion see my [2011]). 
6 I focus on the case of geometry in this paper. Although there are of course notable and 
important differences between Kant’s handling of geometry and his handling of arithmetic and 
algebra, though there are grounds for thinking that geometrical knowledge was for Kant the 
paradigmatic case of mathematical knowledge (his mathematical examples are primarily 
Euclidean examples (e.g. Bxi-xii, A164/B205, A716-7/B745).   
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7 There are well-known complications here with regard to interpreting the nature of the 
‘synthetic’ and ‘analytic’ methods supposedly deployed in the Critique and the Prolegomena 
respectively, whereby only the latter is supposed to be pursued upon the assumption of some 
well-grounded body of knowledge. However, I take it to be well established that Kant frequently 
argues from the basis of the assumption of some a priori knowledge in the form of mathematical 
knowledge (most notably in the argument for transcendental idealism in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic) – see Bx, A4/B8, B4, B20, A38-9/B55-6. For a recent discussion of the meaning of 
Kant’s synthetic method, see Merritt (2006).  
8 That Kant is interested in securing epistemological (and not merely psychological) results does 
not entail that his inquiry cannot be construed as one into the literal origins or sources of our 
concepts, although it does require re-consideration of the type of epistemic normativity that 
might be at stake here, as I argue in my (2011). I take it that the account presented here is in 
some ways supportive of the picture presented in Longuenesse (1998). 
9 Henceforth, the ‘Inquiry’. 
10 Kant’s insistence here on looking to actual practice in order to determine proper method is 
repeated in the Inaugural Dissertation, where he states that ‘in natural science and mathematics, use 
gives the method’ (§23, 2:410 – emphasis in original).  
11 The essential character of mathematical concepts as ‘elective’ is noted by Sutherland (2010). 
12 See Jäsche Logic, §§4-5.  
13 However, caution is required here, since Kant is not explicit with regard to what in fact 
determines the parameters for givenness in this sense. 
14 As Kant puts it: 
 
In mathematics I begin with the definition of my object, for example, of triangle, or a 
circle, or whatever. In metaphysics I never begin with a definition. Far from being the first 
thing I know about the object, it is nearly always the last thing I come to know. In 
mathematics, namely, I have no concept of my object at all until it is furnished by the 
definition. In metaphysics I have a concept which is already given to me, although it is a 
confused one. My task is to search for the distinct, complete and determinate concept. 
(Inquiry, 2:283) 
 
This is a claim that Kant retains in the first Critique. There he holds that, it is still the case that 
mathematics begins with definitions, although it is unclear as to whether or not he now holds the 
achievement of definition in metaphysics to be possible at all. (A729-32/B757-760). 
15 It is clear then that in 1763 Kant still viewed the proper method of metaphysics to be that of 
analysis, a view famously rejected in the Critique. 
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16 This distinction corresponds to types of representational vehicle. Both types of representation 
can serve to express general content – e.g. <triangularity> can be expressed through a picture of a 
triangle or through the tokening of the word ‘triangle’ – the difference consists in the manner in 
which each type of representational vehicle expresses that same representational content. When 
considered with regard to our performance of mathematical operations, the distinction broadly 
corresponds to the contemporary one in developmental psychology and neuroscience between 
nonsymbolic and symbolic numerical cognition, i.e. the respective products of our abilities to 
represent quantities through dots, strokes, etc. on the one hand and to symbolize those 
representations in terms of Arabic or Roman numerals or natural language on the other, e.g. see 
Ansarib, Chee and Venkatramana (2005), Fias and Verguts (2004), Lipton and Spelke (2005), 
Spelke (2011). Parsons (1983) gives an illuminating discussion of the possible role of ‘concrete 
tokens’ deployed for the purpose of ‘verifying general propositions’ (136). Though my emphasis 
on concept acquisition of course differs significantly from the approach pursued there, my 
account of the epistemic role of signs in concreto (which is performed by intuitions in the Critique) is 
broadly in accord with Parsons’ account of intuition. For differing accounts, see Hintikka (1969), 
Howell (1973) and Thompson (1972). 
17 See Friedman (1985), Shabel (2010), Young (1984). 
18 I discuss this theme more in my ‘Kant on Signs in Concreto in Geometry’ (ms). 
19 The notion of intuition itself was made in the Inaugural Dissertation – the recognition of its 
necessary co-deployment with concepts for cognition, i.e. the Discursivity Thesis, was not made 
until the first Critique.  
20 This point is stressed in Warren (1998) and Waxman (2005). 
21 Either individually or coterminously, as when we can access spatial information through both 
touch and sight. 
22 Although Kant is not clear on this point, I see no reason to take him as claiming that our 
imaginational access to intuitional content does not involve sensory content, but rather that it 
involves an indirect reproduction of such content.  
23 When Kant is discussing the importance of the distinction of mathematics and philosophy, he 
notes that mathematicians have rarely philosophized regarding the nature of their own practice. 
He chastises them for neglecting that task, which he then characterizes as that of accounting 
‘[f]rom whence the concepts of space and time with which they busy themselves…might have 
been derived’ (A725/B753).  
 
24 Typical statements of the dangers of invented concepts can be found at A222-B279. 
25 Cassirer (1983) claims that Kant read the Nouveaux Essais sometime between its publication in 
1765 and the writing of the Inaugural Dissertation in 1770 (97-99), though he offers little 
justification for the claim. Tonelli (1974) adduces evidence for thinking that any familiarity Kant 
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had with the work could not have occurred second-hand through its reception by his 
contemporaries. I think a case can be made for Kant’s first-hand familiarity with the Nouveaux 
Essais (e.g. he refers to the ‘Essays of Locke and Leibniz’ (4: 257) in the Prolegomena two years 
after the publication of the first edition of the first Critique) though to do so would be beyond the 
scope of this paper. In what follows I present one example of the similar themes and modes of 
expression to be found in both the Nouveaux Essais and in Kant’s Critical writings.  
26 The speaker here is Philalethes, who is Locke’s representative, though Leibniz does not have 
Theophilus – his representative – quarrel on these points.  The conception of inference 
expressed by Locke would have been a common one within Cartesian and Port-Royal Logic. 
Hume too would have subscribed to it, challenging not the conception of inference at stake, but 
rather the scope of the knowledge that might be attained through it. For an excellent discussion 
of these topics see Owen (1999).  
27 The passage is worth considering not least since it gives one likely contender for the source of 
Kant’s focus upon the word ‘intuition’ (Anschauung, but which Kant also refers to with the Latin 
intuitus) that connects it with the epistemic sense of intuitive knowledge found in the rationalist 
tradition.  
28 Whereas Leibniz describes the demonstrative reasoning employed in proving Proposition I.32 
as a ‘chain of items of intuitive knowledge [enchaînement des connaissances intuitives]’ Kant’s reasoning 
with regard to the same proposition is held to proceed through a ‘chain of inferences [eine Kette 
von Schlüssen] that is always guided by intuition’.  
29 E.g. Friedman (1985), Shabel (2003), (2006). 
30 I have presented the critique here as if an empiricist account of geometrical concept acquisition 
is Kant’s target. However, I argue in my (2014) that the primary target of the critique is in fact 
Mendelssohn’s rationalist approach. Both positions are, I would claim, effectively criticised in the 
passage. Shabel (2004) argues that one of the targets here is one who employs empirical methods 
of proofs with regard to Proposition I.32 and that this target was in fact Wolff, who presented an 
account whereby the geometer proceeded with particular claims regarding the management of 
the compass, etc. (209-212). Perhaps Kant does have Wolff’s proof in mind here, as it would give 
a plausible alternative of what it would be to ‘read off’ properties of a figure. Similarly, Dunlop’s 
(2013) account of Wolff’s theory of geometrical concept acquisition might suggest that he is the 
target here, since that account seems to imply the adequacy of the acquisition of the concept 
<triangle> from occasions of perception of triangle instances (462).  
31 See my (2014) for discussion. 
32 ‘Über Kästner's Abhandlungen,’, (20: 411), translated by. D.R. Lachterman, quoted from 
Lachterman (1989, 53). 
33 For discussion of Kant’s notion of analyticity and containment see e.g. Anderson (2004) and 
(2005), de Jong (1995) and Proops (2005).  
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34 This passage is traditionally thought to be indicative of Kant’s familiarity with Berkeley’s 
criticism of Lockean abstract ideas in the Principles (e.g. [Guyer 1998, 165]). 
35 I have not attempted to give anything like a complete account of the relationship between 
geometrical concepts, geometrical schemata, and spatiotemporal intuition. Nor have I attempted 
to adjudicate here with regard to how this account might figure within recent debates in Kant’s 
philosophy of mathematics. However, it is perhaps worth noting some potential relevance in 
regard to one such recent debates, that between Michael Friedman, and Lisa Shabel concerning 
the status of diagrammatic reasoning in Kant’s philosophy of geometry. One of the points of 
concern is how generality might be expressed via a particular image contained in a diagram. 
Friedman’s claim is that it is clear that for Kant the generality is contributed by virtue of the 
conceptual representations the subject possesses prior to the construction procedure involving 
particular diagrams: 
 
In particular, whereas such diagrammatic accounts of the generality of geometrical 
propositions, as we have seen, begin with particular concrete diagrams and then 
endeavor to explain how we can abstract from their irrelevant particular features 
(specific lengths of sides and angles, say) by relying only on their co-exact features, 
Kant begins with general concepts as conceived within the Leibnizean (logical) 
tradition and then shows how to “schematize” them sensibly by means of an 
intellectual act or function of the pure productive imagination. (Friedman, 2012, 
239) 
 
On the interpretation suggested here, Kant’s rejection of the Leibnizean logical tradition is more 
thoroughgoing than Friedman envisages. This is so, I claim, since for Kant the concept is not 
possessed prior to the schematization process. Rather we acquire the explicit discursive 
representation in the course of schematizing over intuition. This is the sense in which the 
concepts are ‘originally acquired’. My reading thus supports Manders’s (2008) account of 
‘conceptualization via the diagram construction conditions’ (74).   
 
36 For comments on earlier versions of this paper I am grateful to audiences at Humboldt 
University, University of Amsterdam, University of California at Berkeley and Clare College, 
Cambridge 
 
Dear Emily, 
 
I’ve attempted to improve the clarity of the piece by making changes to each of your 
comments on the following pages of the previously submitted document: 
 
p. 5 – the nature of the acquisition of given concepts 
pp. 6-7 – the meaning of rule-governed operations in this context  
p. 8 – the meaning of inference in this context 
p. 10 – clarity on the passage regarding imaginational use of pure intuition. 
p. 18 – reformulation of sentence on the influence of Leibniz. 
 
I’ve also tried to catch the various remaining typos and word substitution suggestions. 
 
 
Revised Memo
